Anomaly detection is an important technique used to identify patterns of unusual network behavior and keep the network under control. Today, network attacks are increasing in terms of both their number and sophistication. To avoid causing significant traffic patterns and being detected by existing techniques, many new attacks tend to involve gradual adjustment of behaviors, which always generate incomplete sessions due to their running mechanisms. Accordingly, in this work, we employ the behavior symmetry degree to profile the anomalies and further identify unusual behaviors. We first proposed a symmetry degree to identify the incomplete sessions generated by unusual behaviors; we then employ a sketch to calculate the symmetry degree of internal hosts to improve the identification efficiency for online applications. To reduce the memory cost and probability of collision, we divide the IP addresses into four segments that can be used as keys of the hash functions in the sketch. Moreover, to further improve detection accuracy, a threshold selection method is proposed for dynamic traffic pattern analysis. The hash functions in the sketch are then designed using Chinese remainder theory, which can analytically trace the IP addresses associated with the anomalies. We tested the proposed techniques based on traffic data collected from the northwest center of CERNET (China Education and Research Network); the results show that the proposed methods can effectively detect anomalies in large-scale networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A NOMALY detection, which aims to identify the presence of unusual network traffic patterns, has become an increasingly critical challenge for network security and management. In recent years, many different kinds of threats continually appear, and the slow and continual attacks are becoming more intelligent than we expected [1] , [2] . These new attacks tend to involve a gradual adjustment of behaviors to avoid causing obvious changes in statistical traffic patterns, such as the total number of bytes, number of packets or flows, etc., allowing them to avoid being detected by existing techniques. In this paper, we name those attacks designed to incorporate specific strategies for detection avoidance smart attacks; which include APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attacks [1] , [2] , Botnet [3] , Stuxnet [4] , etc. Most traditional anomaly detection methods mainly examine the statistical patterns extracted from the total volume of raw traffic, and thus have limited efficacy in detecting smart attacks, which do not cause significant changes in traffic patterns [5] - [9] . Moreover, the statistical features of traffic have changed substantially in terms of the network, architectures and applications currently in use [10] , [11] . As a result, the question of how to extract stable and efficient traffic patterns from massive raw traffic data and improve the capacity to detect smart attacks has become a key challenge for anomaly detection. Accordingly, to address this challenge, we propose the behavior symmetry degree as a means of characterizing the abnormal network behaviors. We then combine this with a sketch to detect and trace the abnormal hosts with high efficiency and accuracy.
In this work, we use a directed graph G(V, E) to model a network, as shown in Fig 1, in which the vertices V denote the hosts and the edges E represent the communication between hosts [12] . Generally speaking, the NIDS (networkbased intrusion detection system) collects traffic data from the egress routers, and the set of hosts V can be categorized into two groups: internal hosts and external hosts. The former group contains all hosts inside the monitored network, while the latter contains all hosts outside that communicate with the internal hosts. In G, each edge e ∈ E represents a communication session between the internal and external hosts, which is a set of aggregated packets with the same internal and external addresses. This should include both the forward and backward packets under normal circumstances; we use a bidirectional relationship denoted by the black edges to represent it, as shown in Fig.1 . From our previous experiments and analysis, we have noted that most of the abnormal behaviors of interest generate many incomplete flows due to their running mechanisms, which only contain forward or backward packets. As shown in Fig.1 , the red links between the internal and external hosts denote incomplete sessions. In this work, we employ degrees of connection to capture those kinds of characteristics; the efficiency of this approach has been verified in [13] , [14] . To detect whether the internal hosts are abnormal or not, we mainly focus on analyzing the characteristics of the internal hosts. To carry out the internal host profiling, we define two connection degrees: (1) the In Connection Degree of a specific Internal host (ICDI), which represents the number of unique external IP addresses that send packets to the specific internal IP address during a time window T ; (2) the Out Connection Degree of a specific Internal host (OCDI), which is the number of the unique external IP addresses that receive packets from the specific internal IP address during a time window T. Both the ICDI and OCDI can effectively profile the abnormal hosts with incomplete sessions; e.g., in Fig.1 , I 3 is attacking other hosts by sending scanning packets to explore vulnerable targets, so it gets a bigger OCDI and a smaller ICDI because most of the scanning requests do not receive responses. Moreover, in this work, we furthermore propose the Symmetry Degree of the specific Internal host (SDI), which can be defined using the maximum ratio between the OCDI and ICDI, to characterize this kind of abnormal behavior effectively.
To improve the efficiency and scalability of the developed method, we also employ a sketch for SDI calculation and anomaly-related IP address tracing. We divide the internal IP addresses into four segments based on the structure of the IPv4 addresses. Each segment is selected as the key of the hash functions in the sketch to minimize the memory cost and the probability of collision. Furthermore, we also use the Chinese remainder theorem to design the hash functions, thus making the sketch reversible. We can simply use the information from hash functions to reconstruct the abnormal IP addresses by performing analytical calculations based on the Chinese remainder theorem. In other words, we can obtain the anomaly-related IP addresses efficiently via analytical calculation, and the computational time remains constant regardless of the size of traffic volume. We also design a threshold selection method based on the dynamic traffic patterns to select suitable thresholds and improve the detection accuracy.
Finally, to evaluate the proposed method in real network scenarios, several real datasets collected from the northwest center of CERNET are used to test the proposed method, and results are compared with those of several state-of-the-art algorithms. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms existing methods, as it can detect anomalies with high accuracy, as well as low computational and memory cost.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) A graph-based network model is proposed to describe the communication patterns between end hosts, in which a symmetry degree is defined to effectively characterize the anomalies. The proposed model aggregates packets with the same internal and external IP addresses into one session, which can significantly reduce the number of records and computational complexity. 2) IP segments are used as the keys of the hash functions in the sketch, and a reversible sketch is designed using the Chinese remainder theorem. Consequently, the model can minimize the memory cost and collision probability. Furthermore, the proposed method can trace the anomaly-related IP addresses to facilitate efficient security management characterized by analytic calculation and constant computational time.
3) The proposed method is memory and computationally efficient; this is tested using large-scale, real-world traffic datasets. Compared with existing methods, the proposed method can achieve better performance with lower computational overhead, which is important for online security monitoring in networks today. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related works. In Section 3, we introduce the design goals and threat model. The extracted features and proposed framework are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the data collected, while Section 6 presents the measurement of feature characteristics. Feature calculation and anomaly detection methods are presented in Section 7. Section 8 presents the methods for model parameter selection and optimization. Performance evaluation results are provided in Section 9. The conclusion and some suggestions for future work then follow.
II. RELATED WORKS
Anomaly detection has become an important issue for network management and has thus attracted significant attention from researchers. The main idea is to build a normal behavior model using historical data, then detect those behaviors that deviate from the models.
In network management and security, anomaly detection can be roughly classified into HIDS (host-based intrusion detection) and NIDS (network-based intrusion detection) according to the data sources used. HIDS typically uses data sources such as keystroke biometrics [15] , mouse dynamics [16] , system calls [17] , etc. While HIDS methods are effective in host level anomaly detection, their scalability is limited by the efficiency of data collection. Meanwhile, the most type of data used in NIDS is traffic data, while statistics-based models are the most popular and widely used methods. The basic idea behind statistics-based models is to analyze the statistical characteristics of the traffic patterns (total number of bytes, total number of packets, etc.), then detect the anomalies by identifying the significant pattern changes caused by attacks such as DDOS [6] , [7] . Furthermore, the source and destination IP addresses in the packets can be treated as different hosts or users, allowing us to perform anomaly detection by analyzing the communication patterns among those hosts [18] - [20] . There are a number of statistical methods that are suitable for this kind of pattern analysis, such as the Markov chain and binary composite hypothesis testing [21] - [23] . However, with the increasing number of complex network attacks, especially those carried out by sophisticated hackers, tend to involve gradual changes in their behaviors, under these circumstances, the efficiency of the above mentioned methods is reduced, since this kind of abnormal behavior does not cause significant changes in statistical traffic patterns.
To investigate traffic patterns more efficiently, CISCO proposed the netflow model [24] , which aggregates packets with the same source and destination IP addresses, ports, etc. into one flow. This method shows the logic links between hosts and provides a way to profile the traffic patterns by hosts. Based on this model, a number of methods based on machine learning and data mining have been proposed that aim to perform anomaly detection [25] - [27] . However, the netflow model is a type of non-interactive model that divides the packets in the same session into two or more flows, which is ineffectual for behavior profiling. Another issue for netflow is that the number of flow records could be huge, such that the tasks of monitoring and analyzing may result in serious storage and computation difficulties.
A number of methods have thus been developed that aim to reduce the number of data records to be processed for real-time monitoring. Sampling is one of the most simple and efficient approaches to this problem [28] - [30] . However, sampling may cause important flow fingerprints to be missed, especially when a large overall number of flows are mixed together with the small number of flows generated by anomaly behaviors [31] , [32] . Another approach is to extend the aggregated scale and extract the main traffic matrix characters. The ODflow model [33] and regional flow model [34] have been developed for large-scale traffic monitoring purposes. The experimental results using actual traces in a 10Gbps network environment also verify the efficiency of this approach in traffic profiling. However, those kind of models exhibit low efficiency when it comes to detailed traffic pattern profiling and smart attack detection. Furthermore, different aggregated scales may generate different results, such that is difficult to select the suitable scales for traffic aggregation.
Sketch-based methods are another kind of efficient method widely used in dealing with massive packet volumes for realtime network monitoring. A sketch is a kind of probabilistic dimension reduction techniques that "sketches" a huge number of flows into a probabilistic summary. We can also achieve the goal of traffic measurement and monitoring based on traffic flow information that approximately reconstructed using the information contained in the sketch. Several traffic measurement methods using sketches have been proposed in recent years, such as those that find heavy hitters, heavy changes or estimate flow size distribution [35] - [38] . To further improve the processing efficiency and perform scalable traffic anomaly detection, a sketch can also be implemented on hardware using FPGA [39] , [40] . Sketches can also be used to detect anomalies through combination with other statistical methods, such as the CUSUM algorithm [41] , etc. We can also extract suitable features and combine them with a sketch in order to detect specific anomalies with high accuracy, e.g. the LD-Sketch and SkyShield sketch [42] , [43] . Generally speaking, there are two main issues with the sketch-related methods: (1) designing a suitable hash function for the sketch, as an appropriate hash function can reduce memory cost and probability of collision, which is also crucial for the goal of efficient anomaly-related IP address tracing; (2) selecting suitable features as the keys, such as the source IP address or destination IP address (or a combination thereof), as different keys are suitable for detecting different anomalies.
Additionally, today's attacks on networks are becoming more and more intelligent; they can gradually change their behaviors to avoid causing significant pattern changes, such as changing trends of total bytes or the total number of flows. It is thus a difficult task to identify these slight changes in a vast sea of traffic patterns. Researchers are therefore focusing on extracting new features from different views to achieve detailed behavior profiling. Zhang et al., in [44] , employ the underlying triggering relations of network events to detect stealthy malware activities. Moreover, in [45] , Zhang et al. use the dependency of network requests to detect stealthy malware activities. In our previous works, we developed a reversible user-embedding framework for this kind of behavior detection [46] , extracting measurable and intelligible features and designing an efficient computational method; these approaches are becoming more and more important for detecting those smart attacks.
Accordingly, after focusing on the above problems and performing a close study of the related works, in this work we proposed a symmetry degree sketch to perform degree calculation, anomaly detection and anomaly-related IP address tracing.
III. DESIGN GOALS AND THREAT MODEL
The works in [10] , [11] have shown that statistical network traffic patterns have changed, and that it is very difficult to identify slightly abnormal patterns in a massive amount of traffic patterns. In this paper, we mainly focus on designing a lightweight and efficient framework that can match anomaly detection needs of today's networks. We also outline some assumptions about the adversary and threat model to help the readers to easily comprehend the key points of our work [47] .
A. Design Goals
Taking both lightweightness and efficiency into account, in this paper, we design an online anomaly detection method that meets the following design goals:
1. Simple and usable: The method should be deployable on most enterprise networks without requiring the installation of new hardware components. The features employed should be easily extracted and suitable for use in capturing the pattern differences between normal operations and attacks.
2. Lightweight: The method should be capable of calculating the features with minimal demand for computational resources. Its computational complexity should change slightly with the change of the network scale.
3. Efficient: The method designed should be able to detect the sort of abnormal behaviors that have recently emerged, such as attacks that intentionally control their behaviors to avoid causing obvious changes in the traffic patterns.
B. Assumptions About the Adversary and Threat Model
In a given network, attackers can explore vulnerabilities and then control the weak hosts through vulnerabilities in order to engage in unpermitted behaviors, such as information theft, service monitoring etc. To detect those ongoing attacks and develop an appropriate model, we will elaborate on our assumptions about the adversary and threat model in the following sections.
We assume that an adversary could be someone who has limited knowledge of the monitored network, but nevertheless wants access to the network for some reason. In other words, the adversary does not have the capacity for physical access, but can only explore the network's vulnerabilities using attack technologies. Based on these assumptions, our method is designed to secure against the following common types of attacks:
1. Scanning Attack: This type includes the network and port scan. The attacker tries to explore the vulnerabilities of the hosts inside the target network by chance using these attacks. During the exploring phase, the behavior of exploring by chance will result in a large SDI.
2. Stealthy Attack with Heartbeats: This type includes the Trojan Horse, Botnet and other similar viruses. Once the virus has successfully infected the host, the attacker can utilize the heartbeats to master the running status of the viruses. During the status management phase, the communication behavior will result in a large SDI.
3. Worm and similar attacks: This type include the attacks that can explore the potential targets and propagate automatically. During the propagation phase, the behavior of exploring potential targets will result in a large SDI.
4. DDoS Attack: The attacker employs many bots to occupy most of the computing resources of a specific server so that it becomes unavailable to normal users. During the attack phase, the attack behavior without response will result in a large SDI.
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND DESIGNED FRAMEWORK
To achieve the goal of designing a lightweight and efficient anomaly detection method, we employ the network model presented in Fig.1 to aggregate packets in order to reduce the number of flow records. We also design features that can be easily extracted and understood in order to measure the differences between attacks and the normal operations.
A. Network Model and Behavior Feature Extraction
Assume that the monitored network has m hosts, which can interact with n external hosts. Let I i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) denote the i-th internal host, and E j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) denote the j-th external host, respectively. Assume s i j is equal to 1 when (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n) and there are packets transferred from the internal host I i to the external host E j ; otherwise, s i j is equal to 0. Let d j i equal 1 when (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n) and there are packets transferred from the external host E j to the internal host I i ; otherwise, d j i is equal to 0. The communication patterns in the specific time window T between the internal and external hosts can be represented by the matrix M(t) in Eq.(1). This model can be used to capture the dynamic communication exchange behavior patterns at the host level; its efficiency has been verified in our previous work for application classification [48] .
Based on the proposed model, we define and employ the following features to profile the communication behavior patterns:
Feature1: The In Connection Degree of a specific Internal host (ICDI): The number of unique external hosts that send packets to one specific internal host during the time window T, which is defined as
Feature2: The Out Connection Degree of a specific Internal host (OCDI): The number of unique external hosts that receive packets from the specific internal host during the time window T, which is
Feature3: The Symmetry Degree of a specific Internal host (SDI): this is defined using Equation 4; a constant 1 is added to the denominator and numerator to avoid zero. There are generally two ways to define the symmetric degree: the first can be obtained using the Out connection degree divided by the In connection degree, while the other can be obtained using the In connection degree divided by the Out connection degree.
In this paper, we select the larger of the two values as the symmetry degree to mine the anomalies.
B. Framework of the Methods Designed
Based on the features extracted, we propose an efficient framework for online large-scale network monitoring, which contains the following four steps as shown in Fig.2 :
Step 1: Traffic collection. The network traffic is collected from the northwest center of CERNET; the offline traffic used for performance evaluation is collected using the Coral Reef developed by CAIDA (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis) [49] . Step 2: Behavior symmetry degree calculation. To characterize the anomalies, we calculate the behavior symmetry degree by analyzing the packet set with the same internal and external IP addresses in a specific time window T. We design the degree sketch for efficient degree calculation. To reduce the memory cost and collision probability, we select the IP segments as the keys for hash functions.
Step 3: Anomaly detection. This is primarily performed based on SDI analysis. If the SDI of a host is bigger than a selected threshold, we claim that we have detected an anomaly. Moreover, to adapt to the dynamically changing trends of traffic patterns, a dynamic threshold selection method is proposed.
Step 4: Anomaly-related IP address tracing. We design a reversible sketch by using the Chinese remainder theorem to design the hash functions in the sketch, so that we can trace the anomaly related IP addresses efficiently. We can then control the anomalies by means of suitable policies to keep the network under control.
V. DATA ACQUISITION
In this paper, we collect three different types of data; the anomaly samples, data collected from our lab and data collected from our campus network. The first and second are employed to verify the efficiency of the SDI in abnormal behavior profiling, while the last is used to evaluate the performance of our method.
A. Anomaly Samples Acquisition
In this work, we collected more than 500 sample attacks, including Worms, Botnets, Scanning attacks and DDoS attacks. The identification methods for these anomalies can be categorized into three groups: (1) User reports. Here, users report the attacks they suffered to the administrator and ask for a solution; (2) Botnet detection system. We established a honeynet in our lab that includes more than 40 hosts (http://botwarden.xjtu.edu.cn). The anomalies captured by this honeynet were reported to the botnet detection system; (3) Monitoring system set in the campus network center. We also obtained the raw packets of one specific victimized host or hacker for one specific attack sample. Detailed information about these attacks is presented in Table I . We also outline the detailed attack phase of the captured attack. 
B. Traffic Data Collected From Our Lab
We collected one actual traffic trace from the egress router of our lab, which has 500 users; these users are from different labs in the departments of school of electrical and information engineering of Xi'an Jiaotong University. In total there are about 500 hosts with global IP addresses, including two servers. One of these is an FTP data server with an address as ftp://202.117.54.250:4021. It is mainly used for video and software sharing in the lab. The other is a WEB server with URL http://nskeylab.xjtu.edu.cn, the IP address of which is 202.117.54.254. It is mainly used to provide news and mail services to the students and faculties. Fig.3 presents the network topology and the traffic collection point at the egress router. We filter the traffic collected using the label methods presented in section V.D to filter the anomalies.
C. Large-Scale Data Collected From Our Campus Network
The large-scale data used is collected from the Northwest Regional Center of CERNET, the topology of which is shown in Fig.4 . The network being monitored is the campus network, which contains more than 30,000 end users with self-governed IP addresses, including students, faculty members and contract personnel from service-providing companies. All of the traces used in this paper are collected at an egress router (B2) with a bandwidth of 10Gbps using the traffic collection tool Coral Reef [49] for a time horizon of more than 20 hours ranging from 2017 to 2018. We choose traffic traces that cover three different time periods in order to collect traffic traces with different kind of behaviors. The first is the time period from 2:00 AM to 6:00 AM, when most students are asleep. The second is from 8:00 AM to 12:00 AM, when most of the students have classes. We also select a time period from 8:00 PM to 12:00 PM, when most of the students are using the Internet. In this way, the data-sets contain a variety of behavior profiles and are thus more representative. The basic information of the traces collected is presented in Table II , where # of PKT denotes the total number of packets in the specific trace and # of IH denotes the number of internal hosts. Compared with the public data-sets, the collected dataset has the following advantages: 1) the detailed network configuration, we have the detailed list of IP addresses inside the monitored network, which is employed for connection degrees and SDI calculation of the internal hosts; 2) the fact that the data is collected from a large-scale network, which is useful for verifying the efficiency of our methods.
D. Anomaly Identification From the Trace
We integrated three different ways to identify anomalies from the raw packets in order to construct the benchmark by which to evaluate our methods. Firstly, we build the black IP address list by collecting the security reports from different third parties and the DNS traffic collected from our campus network. The reports collected include the security report published by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Northeastern University (NEUCERT). NEUCERT publishes the abnormal IP addresses they have detected and updates the list every five minutes, which is publicly available at http://antivirus.neu.edu.cn/scan/ssh.php. We also collect abnormal urls from the security company 360; this report can be found at https://webscan.360.cn/url and is updated every day. We also use the detection results of the Botnet detection system set in our lab to monitor whether there are Bots in our campus network. If Bots are found, we can obtain the domains they used to communicate with their masters. Combined with the DNS traffic data collected from our campus network and the abnormal domains obtained, we can obtain the abnormal IP addresses that query these abnormal domains.
In addition to the IP blacklists, we also use Netflow Analyzer (https://www.manageengine.cn/products/netflow/) as a tool to mine anomalies in the data trace. We also manually analyze the statistical traffic characteristics, such as flow size and flow life-time, to determine whether there are anomalies. The methods used include methods developed in our previous works [14] , [34] . We combine these technologies in order to identify all anomalies possible, then employ these verified anomalies to evaluate the developed methods. Detailed information about the anomalies identified is presented in Table III ; here, the number denotes the number of specific attacks in the specific trace, the scan phase means the patterns were identified due to a vulnerability or potential target exploration. The attack phase means the patterns were identified during the attack or destructive phase, the propagation phase means the patterns identified are those of a virus trying to infect other hosts, and the management phase means the patterns identified are those of a hacker managing the status of the infected hosts with heartbeat packets.
VI. FEATURE ANALYSIS

A. SDI Efficiency Measurement Using Anomaly and Normal Behavior Trace
We analyze the SDI of the anomaly samples collected as well as that of the data collected from our lab. The analysis results are shown in Fig.5 . As can be seen from the figure, the SDI values of more than 85% of the abnormal hosts exceed 40, meanwhile, the SDI values of more than 95% of the hosts in our lab equal 1. We also analyze the abnormal hosts with SDI values less than 40, and find that these hosts are Bots controlled by a Bot-master outside the monitored network. In this situation, the Bot-master is outside the monitoring network and the Bots are inside the monitoring network; more than one Bot belonging to the same botnet exist inside the monitoring network. This situation can be explained as the hacker outside the monitoring network try to explore more vulnerable hosts inside the monitoring network and then control them as Bots for further attack. These Bots will send heartbeat packets to the same Bot-master (with the same destination IP address) outside the monitoring network without response.
The destination IP address thus has a larger ICDI than its OCDI. We can detect this kind of Bot-masters by analyzing the SDI of external IP addresses. However, as the traces we collected only contain the communication patterns between the external and the internal hosts, the SDIs of the external hosts are not accurate. Furthermore, we found the SDI of the normal behaviors to be around 1, there are obvious differences between the SDIs of anomalous and normal behaviors. All these results thus verify the efficiency of SDI in anomaly detection.
B. SDI Characteristics Measurement Using Large-Scale Traces
We also verify the efficiency of SDI in profiling anomalies by analyzing the traffic traces collected from CERNET. We firstly analyze the distribution of the SDI, including the CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) and PDF (Probability Distribution Function); the results of this analysis are shown in Fig.6(a) . It can be seen that most of the hosts in the network being monitored have approximately the same OCDI and ICDI, such that the SDI is approximately equal 1. The results of this analysis confirm that most users use the network for information exchange; they send request packets to the servers and receive the response packets from the servers. It can also be seen that some hosts have either a large OCDI or a large ICDI, and that the SDIs of these hosts are thus far away from 1. This is caused by the existence of incomplete sessions, in which the host either sends the request packets but does not receive the response data, or receives many connection requests but does not response to them. These characteristics do not obey the principle of information exchange, which have been explored in our prior works [43] , and we claim that they are useful for detecting anomalies.
To further mine the characteristics of the incomplete sessions and verify our conclusion, we analyze the distribution of the incomplete session size, along with the distribution of the number of incomplete sessions recorded for each host. The analysis results are shown in Fig.6(b) ; here, the outer graph presents the results for flow size, while the inner presents the number of incomplete sessions for each host. As the results show, most of the incomplete sessions have less than three packets. This means that if the flow is a TCP flow, it does not complete the three-way handshake process, which is the necessary beginning process for a TCP connection. If the flow is a UDP flow, moreover, this means there has only small piece of data exchanged, as the UDP is mainly used for files or multimedia transfers between hosts, and there are usually thousands of packets in this kind of application. Thus, we argue that most of these incomplete sessions are generated by attacks, instead of the normal operations. In other words, the SDI is efficacious in anomaly profiling. From the inner figure, we can also see that most of users only experience 15 incomplete sessions or less during the monitoring time period; these may be caused by random normal behaviors, such as inputting an incorrect domain into a browser and receiving no response. However, we also note that there are several hosts exhibiting hundreds or thousands of incomplete sessions, which is obviously different from normal operations. These results support the conclusion that a larger SDI is mainly caused by abnormal behaviors, and thus supports the efficiency of its use in anomaly detection.
C. SDI Robustness Analysis 1) Sensitivity to Different Policies Used by Adversaries:
As the adversary has little knowledge about the target network, he must explore the network's vulnerabilities using a variety of attack technologies, such as scanning the open ports of a specific host. These attacks will generate many incomplete sessions that result in a large SDI. To avoid causing obvious changes to the SDI, the adversary can slow down the attempt frequency or adopt other special policies. If he slows down the attempt frequency, the exploration time will increase dramatically. For example, if explores a network containing 2000 hosts and makes 60 scanning attempts per minute, the exploring process will cost about 33 minutes; however, if he was to control the attempt frequency by attempting 20 times per minute, the total time cost is about 200 minutes. Moreover, if the target network contains more hosts, the exploring process will take even longer, which is unacceptable for most attackers. As he does not have enough knowledge about the target network, many attack policies are not suitable for this case. Thus, the SDI is efficient at detecting abnormal patterns.
2) Sensitivity to Different Attack Phases: The developed SDI is sensitive to the behavior patterns of different phases of the attacks. During the scan phase, the SDI is sensitive to the behavior patterns of Scanning. During the propagation phase, the SDI is sensitive to the behavior patterns of worms, which can automatically explore potential targets. During the attack phase, such as that of a DDoS attack, there will be many incomplete sessions, and SDI is also sensitive to those behavior patterns. It should be noted that if the virus infects the targets via Email, USB disk, or Web script, SDI is not sensitive to those infection behaviors; however, the SDI-based method can detect those attacks during other phases, such as the status management phase.
VII. FEATURE CALCULATION AND ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Data Stream Model
As analyzed before, SDI is an efficacious means of anomaly profiling. Accordingly, in this section, we mainly design methods for efficient SDI calculation. In large-scale networks, the input of the developed method is the continuously arriving packets generated by the hosts inside the monitoring network. For any host inside the monitoring network, we use the IP address as its identification; its connection degrees are calculated using the definition in equation 2 and 3 by analyzing the streaming packet. To accelerate the degree calculation process, we introduce the sketch, which is a kind of data structure widely used for high-speed streaming data processing [35] - [38] . In order to efficiently trace the anomaly, we introduce the Chinese remainder theorem, also known as the Sunzi Theorem, which is widely used for computing, coding and cryptography [50] . The algorithms presented in the following subsection are used to calculate the degree efficiently.
B. Symmetry Degree Sketch Design
Sketch methods have been studied for several years and are widely used in traffic measurement and anomaly detection. Here we employ the sketch for the online calculation of the symmetry degree.
The Out and In connection degree sketches are denoted as B out and B in . We have B = (B 1 , . . . , B H Fig.7 . Initially, the bits in each B i (1 ≤ i ≤ H ) are all set to 0, when a packet p i = (s i , d i ) arrives, each B i is updated by setting the bit in its row f (d i ) and column h k (s i ) to 1, where the label d i is the destination IP address and s i is the source IP address, as in Eq. (5) .
For one specific source IP address i, there are no other hosts mapped to the same items of B 1 (i ),B 2 (i ), . . . , B H (i ) at the same time. Thus, we can obtain the B i of a specific user by calculating the B 1 (i ),B 2 (i ), . . . , B H (i ) via equation 6, after which we can obtain its OCDI(i) and ICDI(i).
To minimize the memory space used and reduce the collision probability for the degree sketch, we divided the IP address into four segments according to the IPv4 structure. Each segment is one byte in length and selected as the key of the hash function in the sketch. Each IP segment only 256 different situations, only if the four segments are conflicted at the same time will the whole IP address be conflicted. Compared with choosing the whole IP address as the key, our method can reduce the length of the hash table, as well as the probability of collision. We employ the sketch with the same structures and hash function groups to calculate the OCDI and ICDI; thus, we can obtain the SDI directly based on the OCDI and ICDI.
C. Hash Function Design
In this work, we employ the Chinese remainder theorem to design the hash functions in the sketch in order to make the connection degree sketch reversible.
The hash function used in this paper is defined in Eq. (7), where m 1 , . . . , m H are different prime numbers.
We select the IP segments as the keys of the hash functions of the degree sketches; the mapping process is outlined in Fig. 8 . We firstly divide the IP address into four segments: I P 1 , I P 2 , I P 3 and I P 4 . Using the first hash function, h 1 (x) ≡ xmodm 1 , we can obtain a 1 , b 1 , c 1 and d 1 .We then set the item corresponding to the string "a 1 .b 1 .c 1 .d 1 " in the hash table to 1. We process other IP segments similarly. Compared with those methods that use whole IP addresses as keys, our methods can reduce the length of the hash table and the probability of collision.
D. Anomaly Threshold Selection
For anomaly detection, we set a threshold for the feature extracted in order to judge whether an anomaly exists. We can use the probability that feature Y falls in the interval (μ − ε, μ + ε) to check whether item Y is abnormal or not, where μ is the expectation and σ is the variance of Y. Chebyshev's theorem is widely used in bound selection. According to this theorem, the probability of feature Y falling in the interval (μ − ε, μ + ε) is not less than 1 − σ 2 /ε 2 .
Usually, the network runs in a normal state and the traffic features are generated by normal operations. We can thus treat the SDI distribution as a normal distribution according to its definition and the analysis results of Fig.6a . Thus, we can use Eq.(8) to calculate the upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we use the expectation μ of the SDI as the baseline, and a distance of two or three standard deviations σ from the baseline as the upper and lower bounds to construct the thresholds. If the symmetry degree at the monitored time point exceeds the range demarcated by the bounds, we regard it as an anomaly. Moreover, to improve detection accuracy, we select the bounds based on dynamic traffic changing patterns. A selected time window is set, after which the expectation and variance of the symmetry degree inside the window are selected to calculate the bounds. The size of the sliding window can be adjusted according to the detection results.
E. Anomaly-Related IP Address Tracing
The problem of tracing anomaly-related hosts can be described follows: when we detect abnormal indices, c i in the hash tables, how can we reconstruct the abnormal hash key x (the original IP addresses) correctly and quickly? In this paper, our solution is to first reconstruct the IP segments and then combine them into IP addresses. The detailed reconstruction process is as follows:
Step1: Extract the abnormal item combinations from each hash table and calculate their corresponding keys. If and only if there is only one item in each table, we can combine the keys into the abnormal IP address directly; if not, go to Step4.
Step2: Based on the extracted abnormal items, we can calculate and obtain different abnormal segments, such as the segment IP 1 , from each hash table according to Eq. (9) .
. . .
Based on the Chinese remainder theorem, Eq.(9) has only one solution, namely Eq.(10).
In a manner similar to the above process, other IP segments IP 2 , IP 3 and IP 4 can be derived. We can then obtain the abnormal IP address as IP(IP 1 .IP 2 .IP 3 .IP 4 ).
Step3: If there are other abnormal item combinations that have not been processed, go to Step4; otherwise we have extracted all abnormal IP addresses.
Step4: Extract an abnormal item combination from the hash tables and go to Step2, then mark this abnormal item combination as processed. If there is no new abnormal item combination that is not processed in the hash tables, the whole tracing process is ended.
F. Traced Anomaly Processing
After anomaly detection is complete, one vital remaining task is to classify the anomalies detected according to their processing agencies and threat degrees. Based on the classification results, the administrator can deal with the high-level threats in a timely fashion by allocating his limited time and energy to resolving them, and thus keep the network under control.
There are two simple ways to classify the anomalies detected. Firstly, by classifying the anomalies detected based on their connection degrees and symmetry degrees, we can assume that those hosts with bigger connection degrees are more dangerous to other hosts and thus need to be processed immediately. Secondly, in our previous work [51] , an anomaly threat degree calculation method is developed based on the characteristics extracted from the threats themselves. The proposed method can also be used here to quantify the threat degrees of the detected anomalies.
As for control policy, we can employ the dynamic quarantine method to control the abnormal behaviors and reduce their influence based on the principle of "assumed guilty before proven innocent", which has been widely used for highly infectious disease control. Zou et al. employed this method to control the propagation of internet worms [52] . Accordingly, we can control the internet access behaviors of hosts with higher threat degrees by using a soft dynamic quarantine method. The quarantine on a given host is released after a fixed quarantine time window, such as 120 seconds. Even if the quarantine on a host is released, this host can be quarantined again if it is again classified as anomalous. This dynamic quarantine method has one obvious advantage: namely, that a false anomaly detection will only lead to a normal host being quarantined for a short time, so that its normal activities will not be excessively impeded.
VIII. PARAMETER ADJUSTMENT AND OPTIMIZATION
The proposed model consists of three important parameters: parameters of the hash functions in the sketch, size of the sliding window and the thresholds. While these parameters can be initially selected based on theoretical analysis and network management experiences, we will need to adjust them if optimal detection performances is to be achieved.
A. Metrics for Performance Evaluation
We use the metrics of precision and recall, which are widely used in the related literature, to evaluate the performance of the developed method. The definitions of precision and recall are presented in Eqs. (11) and (12) , in which the true positives (TP) denote the number of anomalies that are correctly classified as anomalies, false positives (FP) denote the number of the normal events that are wrongly classified as anomalies, and false negatives (FN) denote the number of anomalies that are wrongly classified as normal events, respectively.
precision =
T P T P + F P (11) r ecall = T P T P + F N (12)
B. Initial Parameter Selection
As the sketch designed in the presented work is reversible and can be used for anomaly-related IP address tracing, the IP segments obtained from the reversible analytical process should be unique. Based on the Chinese remainder theorem, when integers m 1 , . . . , m H are co-prime numbers and sufficiently large, there is only one solution for any arbitrary integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n in Eq. x ≡ a 1 (modm 1 )
x ≡ a 2 (modm 2 ) . . .
x ≡ a n (modm n ) As each segment of the IP address is a byte in length and the value is limited to 255, the product of the all selected prime numbers should thus be greater than 255, as shown in Eq. (14) .
Secondly, the sketch designed should use a minimum amount of memory to help ensure easy online application. In this work we select the IP segments as the keys of the hash functions; thus, there are a total of m 4 i different item combinations after mapping based on m i . After the selection of m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n , the number of different items of the symmetry degree sketch should be m 4 1 + m 4 2 + . . . + m 4 n . To minimize the memory used, m 4 1 + m 4 2 + . . . + m 4 n should be as small as possible.
Thus the initial parameter selection problem can be converted to one of selecting the suitable m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n , where m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n are positive prime numbers satisfying the conditions that m 1 ×m 2 ×. . .×m n > 255 and m 4 1 +m 4 2 +. . .+m 4 n have the smallest summation.
C. Adjustment of the Hash Functions
Based on the analysis in Section VIII.B, we find that when H is equal to 4 and the prime numbers are 2, 3, 5 and 11, we can obtain the unique IP address for the smallest memory cost. However, the experimental results show that this selection will result in a high collision rate, and thus low recall and precision. These parameters must therefore be adjusted to achieve better detection performance. Firstly, we give the recall and precision using a single hash table of different primes smaller than 100. We then select those primes that deliver high recall, high precision and lower memory cost for use in designing the hash functions. The results are shown in Fig.9 . As the figure shows, when m j is equal to 2, trace 1 and trace 3 have very low recall and precision, approximately equal to 0. As the prime increases, however, the IP collision rate decreases and the recall and precision increase. When the prime is bigger than 23, the recall and precision of the three traces exceed 90%. Moreover, to ensure the symmetry degree sketch occupies the minimal amount of memory, based on the results in Fig.9 and the selection methods in Section VIII.B, the hash function group selected is shown in Eq. (15) .
The experimental results based on the hash functions in Eq.(15) are shown in Table IV , in which NAV denotes the Number of Anomalies Verified using the methods discussed in section V.D. From Table IV , it can be seen that after modifying the core hash function group, the detection performance is significantly improved. All the recalls of the different traces exceed 90%; however, the precision of trace 1 is lower than 50%, while that of the other traces is also lower than 70%.
The results indicate that the hash functions require further adjustment to improve performance.
To further improve the recall and precision, we analyzed the causes of IP address collisions and their influence on the detection results. It is noted that lower recall and precision are mainly caused by the collisions between segments of the normal and abnormal IP addresses. A simple example is presented in Fig.10 . We assume that there are two abnormal IP addresses and one normal IP address in the monitored network. Segments of the normal IP address conflict with those of the abnormal I P 1 in hash table 1, while segments of the normal IP address also conflict with the abnormal I P 2 in hash table 2. During the process of reversible solution, we obtain three different item combinations, and these two conflicted normal IP segments are combined into an abnormal IP address, resulting in a false detection. To solve this problem, we can increase the number of hash functions to reduce the probability of these conflicts occurring.
In Table V , we present the recall and precision with different numbers of hash functions and different sets of primes. From Table V , we can see that as the number of hash functions increases, the precision increases, which means the degree of conflict is reduced. When H is equal to 4 and m j equals to 29, 31, 43 and 47, respectively, the precision of all traces is higher, as is the recall. Based on these analysis results, the hash function group selected for use is presented in Eq. (16) .
D. Rescaling the Sliding Window
The threshold is another important parameter for obtaining better abnormal detection results. In this paper, we select the threshold based on the dynamic changing traffic patterns by employing a sliding window mechanism, which uses the patterns inside the sliding window before the time point being analyzed to generate the thresholds. Here, we first set the size of the sliding time window to 30 seconds based on the network management experiences; thus, the threshold of the current detection time point is computed based on the network traffic patterns in the past 30 seconds. Fig.11 shows the detection results of the developed algorithm with different sliding window sizes. Fig. 11 shows, an increase in the sliding window size is associated with a rapid decrease in the recall and precision. These results confirm the existence of dynamic changing, we can employ the thresholds extracted from historical data to perform anomaly detection. Additionally, the behavior characteristics of the time points close to the time point being analyzed have a greater influence on the results, while those of the time points far from the analyzed time point have only a small influence. Accordingly, we need to select a suitable sliding window size if we want to achieve better security monitoring results. From the experimental results shown in Fig. 11 , it is evident that when the sliding window size is set to 30, we can obtain higher recall and precision.
E. Threshold Adjustment
Another important parameter is the number of σ in Eq. (8) , which is denoted by L. We selected the mean of the SDI in the sliding window as the baseline, while the L variances are used to generated certain upper and lower bounds to form the range used for anomaly detection. The experimental results with different L values are presented in Table VI. As the Table  shows , the precision increases with the increase of the upper and lower ranges; when we select an L equal to 3, we can obtain higher recall and precision.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Based on the parameters selected in Section VIII, we compare the proposed method with other related methods to verify its performance in terms of recall, precision and computational complexity.
A. Comparison With Statistics-Based Methods
We first select the statistics-based methods to verify the efficiency of the SDI-based method in detecting smart attacks. The total number of flows is selected as the statistical feature in [53] , while the flow size distribution is selected as the statistical features in [54] . In [53] , [54] , the Netflow model is used to aggregate packets into flows.
In [53] , the proposed EGADS contains three components: the time series modeling module, the anomaly detection module and the alerting module. The anomaly detection methods are mainly based on time series models, which can detect anomalies such as outliers whose values differ significantly from the expected values, the change points where the value is significantly different before and after time point t. In this paper, we employ the EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average) method to measure the significant changes in the dynamic changing trends of the total number of flows. If we detect an abnormal change, we regard it as an anomaly. However, because the number of flows of all hosts are massive and the slight changes caused by anomalies usually cannot be identified by the time series model, the recall and precision are lower.
In [54] , the authors employ entropy to measure the distribution of specific traffic features and then perform abnormality detection. Here, we employ entropy to measure the distribution of flow size and perform anomaly detection by identifying the obvious changes in the distribution. However, due to the fact that (as noted above) today's network attacks tend to involve gradual behaviors changes rather than obvious ones, the recall and precision are lower.
The performance evaluation results are shown in Table VII . As the Table shows, statistics-based methods have very low recall and precision. This is because there are thousands of flow records per second in today's networks, meaning that some ongoing anomalies produce no obvious changes in those patterns with some ongoing anomalies. Meanwhile, as SDI is extracted according to the difference between normal behaviors and anomalies, it is more efficient in identifying anomalies in massive traffic patterns.
B. Comparison With Sketch-Based Method Using Fixed Thresholds
As traffic patterns change dynamically and have obvious routine characteristics, we believe that threshold selection should be adaptive to the dynamically changing traffic patterns. Generally speaking, different detection time periods should use different thresholds. There are many works using a fixed threshold for anomaly detection; we believe these fixedthreshold methods will obtain higher recall and precision when the time period being monitored is short. However, the efficiency of these methods will decrease when longer time periods are being monitored. In this paper, we employ the methods proposed in [55] to evaluate the importance of dynamic threshold selection.
Accordingly, we apply different fixed thresholds; the experimental results are presented in Fig.12 . As can be seen from the figure, different traces should select different thresholds in order to obtain better results. As analyzed in Section V.C, the traces are collected from different time periods; as users in different time periods have different behavior characteristics, the selected thresholds should also be different. If we use a fixed threshold, the recall and precision will be very low for other traces in different collection time periods. These results verify that a dynamic threshold selection mechanism is important for long-time security monitoring.
C. Comparison With Sketch-Based Method Using Whole IP Mapping
The whole IP address can be selected as the key of hash functions in the sketch for use in performing abnormal detection [55] - [57] . Usually, the IP address can be treated as a number, with 255255255255 as the maximum value. To perform evaluation, we first selected suitable parameters for the method based on whole IP mapping. Similar to the calculation process in Section VIII.B, we calculated and selected H as 4, while the prime numbers chosen for input into Equation 16 are 569, 577, 587, and 599. Table VIII shows the experimental results of the method based on whole IP address mapping. From Table VIII, we can see that while the recall for this method is higher than that of the proposed method, the precision is lower. This is because the data obtained in the reversible process is a number instead of IP address. When this number is not big enough, we can obtain several IP addresses from the number and generate false detection results. For example, when the number obtained is 1151541228, we can obtain several legal IP addresses, such as 115.154.12.28 or 115.154.1.228. Thus, further analysis combined with network configuration is needed to improve the detection performance, which leads to higher time complexity. 
D. Evaluation of Computational Complexity
We evaluate the computational complexity of our methods against that of several related sketch-based methods: these include the method using a fixed threshold [55] , the method using whole IP address as the key, and tracing the anomalyrelated IP addresses by querying the table of all items and their corresponding keys [56] , [57] . The results of this evaluation are presented in Table IX . As the Table shows, the proposed method can achieve better performance (higher recall and precision) with lower time and computational complexity across all three collected traces, which verifies the efficiency and accuracy of our methods. The main differences between the comparison methods and our method can be summarized as follows: 1) In [55] , the threshold used is fixed and the tracing process is based on the method proposed in this paper.
The results show that the recall and precision is lower than our method; this is caused by the dynamic changing characteristics of the traffic patterns, as well as the fact that a single fixed threshold is not suitable for long-time monitoring. 2) In [56] , the method selects the whole IP address as the key and traces the anomaly-related IP addresses based on the table queries; it also uses the dynamic threshold selection method proposed in this paper to select suitable thresholds. Traditionally, the hash functions are not reversible; to trace the anomaly-related IP addresses, we must therefore store the IP addresses and their corresponding items in a table. After we detect the abnormal items from the sketch, we can query the table to obtain the anomaly-related IP addresses. As the results show, the execution time required by this method is much longer than that of the method proposed, a result that is mainly caused by the time-consuming tracing process. Additionally, it consumes more memory than our methods due to the key selection and the table storage. 3) In [57] , the method employs the IP segments as the keys and a dynamic threshold selection mechanism to select suitable thresholds; however, the tracing method is still based on the table queries. As the results show, the memory cost can be reduced by selecting the IP segments as keys. The recall and precision can also be increased by introducing the threshold dynamic selection mechanism. However, the tracing process is still quite time-consuming, making it unsuitable for the real-time security monitoring and management of a large-scale network.
E. Limitations of the Developed Method
In this paper, we analyzed the differences between the behavior patterns of the normal operations and attacks, finding that SDI is efficacious in anomaly profiling. Accordingly, to design online anomaly detection methods suitable for large-scale networks, we combined the SDI with a sketch to construct an abnormal behavior detection framework that would be memory and computationally efficient when mining anomalies. However, in addition to the advantages of the proposed method, there are also two main limitations. Firstly, the developed methods cannot detect abnormal behavior patterns with both req-ack packets. These abnormal behaviors hold forward and backward packets at the same time, such that the SDI of these anomalies is similar to that of normal behaviors. It is therefore difficult to detect these anomalies in networks today, as their behavior patterns are submerged in the massive volume of traffic features. We can detect those anomalies by combining our method with other methods, such as mining the co-occurrence or periodic behaviors from a long-time period traffic monitoring [44] - [46] . However, it should be noted that the proposed method can deal with most anomalies found in networks today, as they always generate many incomplete sessions and cause significant changes in SDI in specific attack phase. More importantly, the developed methods only focus on the incomplete sessions, which can greatly reduce the run-time overhead for processing network traffic in real-time. Secondly, we only evaluate our methods using traces collected from the campus network of Xi'an Jiaotong University, and assumed that all the packets of one session go through the same router and thus that those behavior patterns are captured for performance evaluation purposes. Our methods can be deployed in other networks with similar configurations for security monitoring. However, there are also some networks with more than one egress routers such that we cannot capture all packets belong to the same session by monitoring one specific router. In this situation, we must analyze the traces collected from multi-routers to achieve the goals of abnormal behavior profiling and detection.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Mining abnormal behavior characteristics and employing them to design abnormality detection methods is one of the most reasonable approaches for anomaly detection. We find that most smart attacks generate a large number of incomplete sessions; thus, we propose the connection degree and symmetry degree to characterize the abnormal behavior patterns and use them to identify anomalies in a vast sea of traffic packets. We design a symmetry degree sketch to calculate the symmetry degree efficiently and improve the scalability of the developed method. To reduce the memory cost and collision probability, we select IP segments as the keys. To make the sketch reversible and enable efficient tracing of the anomaly-related IP addresses, we employ the Chinese remainder theorem to design the hash functions. To capture the dynamic changing trends of traffic patterns, we select the thresholds using a sliding window mechanism. By combining the symmetry degree with the reversible sketch, we can greatly reduce the computational complexity while increasing the detection recall and precision in a large-scale network. We verified the efficiency of our methods through experiments using actual network traffic data traces collected from the northwest center of CERNET. In future work, we will focus on analyzing the traces collected from multi-routers for SDI calculation and anomaly mining.
